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Post by Maolsheachlann on Dec 16, 2018 9:53:42 GMT
I may have posted about this before, but I'm fascinated by the existence of party loyalties in Ireland. Up until about a year ago, I assumed that nobody really had party loyalties in Ireland except (to be blunt) people who didn't really think about the matter much; people who just turned up in the voting booth and voted for Fine Gael or Fianna Fáil because their parents did.
But I was wrong! There really are party loyalties in Ireland, and very intelligent, educated people hold them.
I suppose Labour doesn't surprise me that much. They are a standard left-wing progressive party. And Sinn Féin have been committed Marxists since at least the eighties, although they managed to fool some of their more traditionalist supporters (and still do).
But Fianna Fail and Fine Gael? What on earth do they stand for? Whas resemblance does Bertie Ahern have with Eamon De Valera, or W.T. Cosgrave have with Leo Varadkar? How can one have a genuine party loyalty to a catch-all party whose beliefs change every ten or twenty years? Or are there deeper consistencies I'm not seeing?
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Post by cato on Dec 16, 2018 13:35:29 GMT
I think the idea of political families is strong especially in rural areas. Even families that may not have direct links may have a history of voting a certain way. My family has a Fine Gael leaning going back to a relation in the Blueshirts imprisoned by Dev's government in the 1930s.
A local priest told me socially prominent Fine Gael members and parishioners (ahem) were prepared to campaign for Repeal because the party policy stance was more inportant than their faith. I wonder how that line will go down on judgement day?
I d say the phenomena of party loyalty is faltering as part of the general phenomena of individualisation apart from voters repelled at fundamental policy u turns and economic catastrophies.
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Post by rogerbuck on Dec 16, 2018 21:54:10 GMT
I fear wading into this. I imagine I may be YEARS OUT OF DATE. And therefore very naive indeed.
But John Waters writes very acutely I think about FF and FG having had very distinct psychologies, which explains a little the sense of intense animosity between the tribes in the past and still today?.
Naive ... out of date . . . but here goes.
I wonder if FF is still a little more Statist than FG, closer to Southern Catholic countries in Europe, whereas as FG is more Laissez Faire, Economically Liberal closer to Anglo-American world.
I wonder if FF does have more of the old Irish patriotism somewhere in its bones and a residue of cultural conservatism. I see its spirit slightly closer to de Gaulle and FG slightly closer to Thatcher ...
Maybe these are really naive stereotypes.
I am not at this forum, because I am BURIED in my new book. But hopefully I'll re-emerge next year ...
Meanwhile, I will just paste in something from the Economist which horrifies me.
The countries it links Ireland seems to me to have more to do with FG than FF ... But what do I know? Would be interested if my hypotheses make any sense?
I'm adding some bold ... Why is Ireland aligned like this?
Northern member states unite on euro-zone reform
The group, dubbed the New Hanseatic League, abhors fiscal transfers
Print edition | Europe
Dec 8th 2018 | HELSINKI
In the late Middle Ages the Hanseatic League, a confederation of merchant guilds in northern Europe, dominated maritime trade in the Baltic and North seas. Now finance ministers from the northern states, characterised by their fiscally hawkish and free-market views, are hoping to set the course for reforms to the European Union. Composed of Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands and Sweden, the group, dubbed the New Hanseatic League, is starting to have some influence.
The immediate impulse for the alliance, which first assembled over dinner in Brussels about a year ago, is Brexit. The group had considered its interests well enough represented as long as Britain’s free-market stance and Germany’s fiscal prudence tempered the French enthusiasm for “solidarity” (ie, redistribution) and protectionism.
But Britain’s withdrawal means that they have lost a champion of openness.
At the same time, the French and the Germans have an irksome habit of cooking up reforms to the single-currency area between them. The latest example of that was in June, when Emmanuel Macron and Angela Merkel agreed a common position. Their declaration formed the basis for the package of reforms that eu finance ministers thrashed out on December 4th, and which will be formally agreed on by heads of state in Brussels on December 14th.
Some proposals—such as those to strengthen the euro zone’s bank-resolution and sovereign-rescue funds—have broad support. The league’s abhorrence of fiscal transfers, though, has put it on a collision course with the French. Mr Macron has pushed for a common budget to help stabilise unlucky countries struck down by economic problems.
But a joint paper by the league’s finance ministers in March stresses that “first and foremost” countries must be in “full compliance” with the eu’s fiscal rules. If each member acted responsibly and whipped its public finances into shape, then it would be able to deal with economic shocks without other states’ taxpayers having to bail it out. The hawks argue, with an obvious eye on Italy, that a stabilisation scheme that shares risks across countries would also encourage profligacy. The league would rather concentrate on unleashing market forces within the eu—for instance, accelerating reforms to the capital market, or striking more trade deals with third countries.
The eight Hanseatic countries, which together constitute barely a tenth of the eu’s population, cannot block decisions by Europe’s Council of Ministers. (Most formal votes require a “qualified” majority; for a proposal to be rejected, at least four countries representing 35% of the bloc’s population must vote against.) But proposals for reform tend to be based on political consensus rather than formal votes, so the league still has influence. It has recruited other members to its cause. Slovakia also signed its paper on the sovereign bail-out fund in November, for instance. It might also hope to toughen Germany—whose cities helped found the medieval Hanseatic League, and which is seen as a silent partner of its modern namesake—in its talks with France.
On December 4th eu finance ministers approved further work on a version of Mr Macron’s budget plan. But, in a victory for the hawks, it is much watered down. It will focus on enhancing competitiveness and convergence, not stabilisation, and will sit within the existing eu budget rather than getting substantial new funds. Perhaps the clearest sign of the league’s success is that it has needled the French. In November Bruno Le Maire, the French finance minister, attacked it as “dangerous for Europe”. Its members reject the accusation that it represents a hardening of the divide between the north and south, saying it wants to be constructive. Agreeing on reforms was never going to be plain sailing.
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Post by rogerbuck on Dec 17, 2018 9:52:43 GMT
Will quickly add re this - The immediate impulse for the alliance, which first assembled over dinner in Brussels about a year ago, is Brexit. The group had considered its interests well enough represented as long as Britain’s free-market stance and Germany’s fiscal prudence tempered the French enthusiasm for “solidarity” (ie, redistribution) and protectionism. But Britain’s withdrawal means that they have lost a champion of openness.I believe Dev in the 1920s and 30s was aiming at something like the French and he and FF would have seen Cosgrove and the early version of FG as something like this British so-called "openness". I would like to believe that somewhere something of this spirit still exists in FF's "DNA" so to speak, but I fear my naiveté ... |
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Post by Maolsheachlann on Dec 17, 2018 13:38:56 GMT
These economic waters are too deep for me, I'm afraid. But isn't it true to say that "credit transfers" within the EU usually come with crippling conditions in any case?
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Post by cato on Dec 17, 2018 20:31:15 GMT
The famous obligation to allow freedom of movement means any EU citizen can by right come and live any where in the EU. Very few Irish people draw the dole in Bulgaria or are on a hospital waiting list in Estonia. Strangely enough.
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Post by rogerbuck on Dec 21, 2018 10:12:08 GMT
These economic waters are too deep for me, I'm afraid. But isn't it true to say that "credit transfers" within the EU usually come with crippling conditions in any case? This is deep for me, too, Mal - but seems so critically important that I desperately need to educate myself more. Still, even without comprehensive economic awareness, I know what the Economist means by so-called British "openness" is Corporate Libertarianism. Liberating corporations and banks as much as possible from social concerns. I know, by contrast, the French are not nearly so "open". There is more solidarity there in France, as the Economist notes (and hates). And the point I am groping towards, to bring this back to the original topic, is that historically FG has always been more like the British. Cosgrave was more into such "openness" than Dev. And Dev I think was more like the French, more into the solidarity The Economist HATES. |
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Post by cato on Dec 21, 2018 10:39:32 GMT
These economic waters are too deep for me, I'm afraid. But isn't it true to say that "credit transfers" within the EU usually come with crippling conditions in any case? This is deep for me, too, Mal - but seems so critically important that I desperately need to educate myself more. Still, even without comprehensive economic awareness, I know what the Economist means by so-called British "openness" is Corporate Libertarianism. Liberating corporations and banks as much as possible from social concerns. I know, by contrast, the French are not nearly so "open". There is more solidarity there in France, as the Economist notes (and hates). And the point I am groping towards, to bring this back to the original topic, is that historically FG has always been more like the British. Cosgrave was more into such "openness" than Dev. And Dev I think was more like the French, more into the solidarity The Economist HATES. Cosgrave in the 1920s ran a free market economically liberal model. He does deserve credit for restoring Irish finances after the civil war. Indeed he was determined to disprove those English commentators who said Ireland could never balance her books. It was a tough place to be poor in and it was left largely to churches to provide poor relief and health provision. Dev was more protectionist and interventionist. John Maynard Keynes was invited to Dublin to give some sort of intellectual backing for the new policies. The basic aim was to be as self sufficient as possible. The drawback is you can end up manufacturing shoddy and more expensive products at home. Which is what happened. In fairness to Dev this movement to Autarchy or self sufficency was widely practised outside the British Empire in the 1930s. Dev also ramped up more on social welfare. Professor Joe Lee in his Ireland 1912 -1985 offers an excellent overview of Ireland particularly economic and social policy . He also compared Ireland with other small similar European countries. The failure to stem emigration and the decline in living standards is the main reason why Ireland embraced European Community membership with such enthusiasm. As much as I value sovereignty the EU has delivered enormous economic benefits . The Irexit argument doesn't add up , which is a pity .Unlike the UK we aren't big enough unfortunately to go it alone. Unless we discover oil.... And then it's Norway mark ii! |
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Post by cato on Dec 30, 2018 22:21:28 GMT
Recent polls indicate that Fianna Fail and Fine Gael at 32% and 27% have roughly 60% support. Most of the public at present seem content with a socially liberal, Europhile and fiscally conservative political outlook. A generally improving economy ,for most,and falling umemployment are benefiting the two big establishment parties.
I was a bit surprised in the aftermath of the banking collapse that we didn't see terrorism aimed at the banking sector and politicians associated with it. The 1970s witnessed widespread left wing terror attacks in Europe and the provos/ INLA were explicitly socialist. The recent attacks on a Roscommon farm a couple of weeks ago seem to involve Republican militants who don't accept the IRA ending their conflict.
The case was difficult to understand due to RTE censoring key details, probably due to PC concerns. I have noticed more and more RTE only giving a very selective and often misleading interpretation of major news stories.
The family concerned seems quite well off and are not the stereotypical impoverished eviction victims. The evicting baliffs seem to have a loyalist/ British army background . Anyone with any knowledge of the history of landlordism would know this would be a red rag to a bull in rural Ireland.
Whether this case is unique or whether extremists are going to take on the banks in a campaign that could reap political dividends remains to be seen. On line there seems to be a lot of sympathy for those using direct violent measures against the almighty banks and their agents.
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